Self-Review Questionnaire: Security and Privacy

Editor’s Draft,

This version:
https://w3ctag.github.io/security-questionnaire/
Latest published version:
https://www.w3.org/TR/security-privacy-questionnaire/
Issue Tracking:
GitHub
Editors:
(Apple Inc.)
(Brave)
Former Editors:
Jason Novak (Apple Inc.)
Lukasz Olejnik (Independent researcher)
(Google Inc.)

Abstract

This document contains a set of questions to be used when evaluating the security and privacy implications of web platform technologies.

Status of this document

This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C technical reports index at https://www.w3.org/TR/.

This document was jointly published by the W3C’s Technical Architecture Group (TAG) and Privacy Interest Group (PING) as a Editor’s Draft. Publication as a does not imply endorsement by the W3C Membership. This is a draft document and may be updated, replaced or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite this document as other than work in progress.

Feedback and comments on this document are welcome. Please file an issue in this document’s GitHub repository.

This document was produced by groups operating under the W3C Patent Policy. The W3C maintains a public list of any patent disclosures made in connection with PING deliverables; that page also includes instructions for disclosing a patent.

This document is governed by the 15 September 2020 W3C Process Document.

1. Introduction

When designing new features for the Web platform, we must always consider the security and privacy implications of our work. New Web features should always maintain or enhance the overall security and privacy of the Web.

This document contains a set of questions intended to help spec authors as they think through the security and privacy implications of their work and write the narrative Security Considerations and Privacy Considerations sections for inclusion in-line in their specifications, as described below in § 2.16 Does this specification have both "Security Considerations" and "Privacy Considerations" sections?. It also documents mitigation strategies that spec authors can use to address security and privacy concerns they encounter as they work on their spec.

This document is itself a work in progress, and there may be security or privacy concerns which this document does not (yet) cover. Please let us know if you identify a security or privacy concern this questionnaire should ask about.

1.1. How To Use The Questionnaire

Spec authors should work through these questions early on in the design process, when things are easier to change. When privacy and security issues are only found later, after the feature has shipped, it’s much harder to change the design. If security or privacy issues are found late, user agents may need to adopt breaking changes to protect their users' privacy and security.

These questions should be kept in mind throughout work on any specification. Spec authors should periodically revisit this questionnaire to continue to consider the privacy and security implications of their spec’s features, particularly as their design changes over time.

1.2. TAG, PING, and security reviews and this questionnaire

Before requesting privacy and security reviews from the Privacy Interest Group (PING) and security reviewers, respectively, authors must write both "Security Considerations" and "Privacy Considerations" sections for their documents, as described in § 2.16 Does this specification have both "Security Considerations" and "Privacy Considerations" sections?. While your answers to the questions in this document will inform your writing of those sections, it is not appropriate to merely copy this questionnaire into those sections. Instructions for requesting security and privacy reviews can be found in the Guide.

When authors request a review from the Technical Architecture Group (TAG), the TAG asks that authors provide answers to the questions in this document.

The TAG may use this document to record security and privacy questions which come up during their reviews. Working through these questions can save both spec authors and the people performing design reviews a lot of time.

To make it easier for anyone requesting a review to provide their answers to these questions to the TAG, we have prepared a list of these questions in Markdown.

1.3. Additional resources

This document is only one of the tools you should use to inform your consideration of privacy and security issues in your spec.

The Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications [FINGERPRINTING-GUIDANCE] document published by PING goes into further depth about browser fingerprinting and should be considered in parallel with this document.

The IETF’s RFC about privacy considerations, [RFC6973], is a wonderful resource. We recommend that all spec authors read section 7 of RFC6973.

2. Questions to Consider

2.1. What information might this feature expose to Web sites or other parties, and for what purposes is that exposure necessary?

User Agents should only expose information to the web when doing so is necessary to serve a clear user need. Does your feature expose information to origins? If so, how does exposing this information serve user needs? Are the risks to the user outweighed by the benefits to the user? If so, how?

See also

2.2. Do features in your specification expose the minimum amount of information necessary to enable their intended uses?

Features should only expose information when it’s absolutely necessary to satisfy use cases. If a feature exposes more information than is necessary, why does it do so?

See also

2.3. How do the features in your specification deal with personal information, personally-identifiable information (PII), or information derived from them?

Personal information is any data about a user (for example, their home address), or information that could be used to identify a user, such as an alias, email address, or identification number.

Note: Personal information is distinct from personally identifiable information (PII). PII is a legal concept, the definition of which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When used in a non-legal context, PII tends to refer generally to information that could be used to identify a user.

When exposing personal information, PII, or derivative information, spec authors must take steps to minimize the potential harm to users.

A feature which gathers biometric data (such as fingerprints or retina scans) for authentication should not directly expose this biometric data to the web. Instead, it can use the biometric data to look up or generate some temporary key which is not shared across origins which can then be safely exposed to the origin. [WEBAUTHN]

Personal information, PII, or their derivatives should not be exposed to origins without meaningful user consent. Many APIs use the Permissions API to acquire meaningful user consent. [PERMISSIONS]

Keep in mind that each permission prompt added to the web platform increases the risk that users will ignore the contents of all permission prompts. Before adding a permission prompt, consider your options for using a less obtrusive way to gain meaningful user consent. [ADDING-PERMISSION]

<input type=file> can be used to upload documents containing personal information to websites. It makes use of the underlying native platform’s file picker to ensure the user understands that the file and its contents will be exposed to the website, without a separate permissions prompt.

See also

2.4. How do the features in your specification deal with sensitive information?

Personal information is not the only kind of sensitive information. Many other kinds of information may also be sensitive. What is or isn’t sensitive information can vary from person to person or from place to place. Information that would be harmless if known about one person or group of people could be dangerous if known about another person or group. Information about a person that would be harmless in one country might be used in another country to detain, kidnap, or imprison them.

Examples of sensitive information include: caste, citizenship, color, credentials, criminal record, demographic information, disability status, employment status, ethnicity, financial information, health information, location data, marital status, political beliefs, profession, race, religious beliefs or nonbeliefs, sexual preferences, and trans status.

When a feature exposes sensitive information to the web, its designers must take steps to mitigate the risk of exposing the information.

The Credential Management API allows sites to request a user’s credentials from a password manager. [CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1] If it exposed the user’s credentials to JavaScript, and if the page using the API were vulnerable to XSS attacks, the user’s credentials could be leaked to attackers.

The Credential Management API mitigates this risk by not exposing the credentials to JavaScript. Instead, it exposes an opaque FormData object which cannot be read by JavaScript. The spec also recommends that sites configure Content Security Policy [CSP] with reasonable connect-src and form-action values to further mitigate the risk of exfiltration.

Many use cases which require location information can be adequately served with very coarse location data. For instance, a site which recommends restaurants could adequately serve its users with city-level location information instead of exposing the user’s precise location.

See also

2.5. Do the features in your specification introduce new state for an origin that persists across browsing sessions?

There are many existing mechanisms origins can use to store information about a user. Cookies, ETag, Last Modified, localStorage, and indexedDB are just a few examples.

Allowing an origin to store data on a user’s device in a way that persists across browsing sessions introduces the risk that this state may be used to track a user without their knowledge or control, either in first- or third-party contexts.

One of the ways user agents mitigate the risk that client-side storage mechanisms will form a persistent identifier is by providing users with the ability to clear out the data stored by origins. New state persistence mechanisms should not be introduced without mitigations to prevent them from being used to track users across domains or without control over clearing this state. That said, manually clearing storage is something users do only rarely. Spec authors should consider ways to make new features more privacy-preserving without full storage clearing, such as reducing the uniqueness of values, rotating values, or otherwise making features no more identifying than is needed. Also, keep in mind that user agents make use of several different caching mechanisms. Which, if any, caches will store this new state? Are additional mitigations necessary?

Service Workers intercept all requests made by an origin, which enables sites to continue to function when the browser goes offline. Because of this, a maliciously-injected service worker could compromise the user (as documented in Service Workers §6 Security Considerations).

The spec mitigates the risks an active network attacker or XSS vulnerability present by limiting service worker registration to secure contexts. [SERVICE-WORKERS]

Platform-specific DRM implementations (such as content decryption modules in [ENCRYPTED-MEDIA]) might expose origin-specific information in order to help identify users and determine whether they ought to be granted access to a specific piece of media. These kinds of identifiers should be carefully evaluated to determine how abuse can be mitigated; identifiers which a user cannot easily change are very valuable from a tracking perspective, and protecting such identifiers from an active network attacker is vital.

2.6. Do the features in your specification expose information about the underlying platform to origins?

(Underlying platform information includes user configuration data, the presence and attributes of hardware I/O devices such as sensors, and the availability and behavior of various software features.)

If so, is the same information exposed across origins? Do different origins see different data or the same data? Does the data change frequently or rarely? Rarely-changing data exposed to multiple origins can be used to uniquely identify a user across those origins. This may be direct (when the piece of information is unique) or indirect (because the data may be combined with other data to form a fingerprint). [FINGERPRINTING-GUIDANCE]

When considering whether or not to expose such information, specs and user agents should not consider the information in isolation, but should evaluate the risk of adding it to the existing fingerprinting surface of the platform.

Keep in mind that the fingerprinting risk of a particular piece of information may vary between platforms. The fingerprinting risk of some data on the hardware and software platforms you use may be different than the fingerprinting risk on other platforms.

When you do decide to expose such information, you should take steps to mitigate the harm of such exposure.

Sometimes the right answer is to not expose the data in the first place (see § 4.6 Drop the feature). In other cases, reducing fingerprintability may be as simple as ensuring consistency—for instance, by ordering a list of available resources—but sometimes, more complex mitigations may be necessary. See § 4 Mitigation Strategies for more.

If features in your spec expose such data and does not define adequate mitigations, you should ensure that such information is not revealed to origins without meaningful user consent, and you should clearly describe this in your specification’s Security and Privacy Considerations sections.

WebGL’s RENDERER string enables some applications to improve performance. It’s also valuable fingerprinting data. This privacy risk must be carefully weighed when considering exposing such data to origins.

The NavigatorPlugins list almost never changes. Some user agents have disabled direct enumeration of the plugin list to reduce the fingerprinting harm of this interface.

See also:

2.7. Does this specification allow an origin to send data to the underlying platform?

If so, what kind of data can be sent?

Platforms differ in how they process data passed into them, which may present different risks to users.

Don’t assume the underlying platform will safely handle the data that is passed. Where possible, mitigate attacks by limiting or structuring the kind of data is passed to the platform.

URLs may or may not be dereferenced by a platform API, and if they are dereferenced, redirects may or may not be followed. If your specification sends URLs to underlying platform APIs, the potential harm of your API may vary depending on the behavior of the various underlying platform APIs it’s built upon.

What happens when file:, data:, or blob: URLs are passed to the underlying platform API? These can potentially read sensitive data directly form the user’s hard disk or from memory.

Even if your API only allows http: and https: URLs, such URLs may be vulnerable to CSRF attacks, or be redirected to file:, data:, or blob: URLs.

2.8. Do features in this specification enable access to device sensors?

If so, what kinds of information from or about the sensors are exposed to origins?

Information from sensors may serve as a fingerprinting vector across origins. Additionally, sensors may reveal something sensitive about the device or its environment.

If sensor data is relatively stable and consistent across origins, it could be used as a cross-origin identifier. If two User Agents expose such stable data from the same sensors, the data could even be used as a cross-browser, or potentially even a cross-device, identifier.

Researchers discovered that it’s possible to use a sufficiently fine-grained gyroscope as a microphone [GYROSPEECHRECOGNITION]. This can be mitigated by lowering the gyroscope’s sample rates.

Ambient light sensors could allow an attacker to learn whether or not a user had visited given links [OLEJNIK-ALS].

Even relatively short lived data, like the battery status, may be able to serve as an identifier [OLEJNIK-BATTERY].

2.9. What data do the features in this specification expose to an origin? Please also document what data is identical to data exposed by other features, in the same or different contexts.

As noted above in § 3.3 Same-Origin Policy Violations, the same-origin policy is an important security barrier that new features need to carefully consider. If a feature exposes details about another origin’s state, or allows POST or GET requests to be made to another origin, the consequences can be severe.

Content Security Policy [CSP] unintentionally exposed redirect targets cross-origin by allowing one origin to infer details about another origin through violation reports (see [HOMAKOV]). The working group mitigated the risk by reducing a policy’s granularity after a redirect.

Beacon [BEACON] allows an origin to send POST requests to an endpoint on another origin. The working group concluded that this feature did not add any new attack surface above and beyond what normal form submission entails, so no extra mitigation was necessary.

2.10. Do features in this specification enable new script execution/loading mechanisms?

New mechanisms for executing or loading scripts have a risk of enabling novel attack surfaces. Generally, if a new feature needs this you should consult with a wider audience, and think about whether or not an existing mechanism can be used or the feature is really necessary.

JSON modules are expected to be treated only as data, but the initial proposal allowed an adversary to swap it out with code without the user knowing. Import assertions were implemented as a mitigation for this vulnerability.

2.11. Do features in this specification allow an origin to access other devices?

If so, what devices do the features in this specification allow an origin to access?

Accessing other devices, both via network connections and via direct connection to the user’s machine (e.g. via Bluetooth, NFC, or USB), could expose vulnerabilities - some of these devices were not created with web connectivity in mind and may be inadequately hardened against malicious input, or with the use on the web.

Exposing other devices on a user’s local network also has significant privacy risk:

The Network Service Discovery API [DISCOVERY-API] recommended CORS preflights before granting access to a device, and requires user agents to involve the user with a permission request of some kind.

Likewise, the Web Bluetooth [WEB-BLUETOOTH] has an extensive discussion of such issues in Web Bluetooth §2 Security and privacy considerations, which is worth reading as an example for similar work.

[WEBUSB] addresses these risks through a combination of user mediation / prompting, secure origins, and feature policy. See WebUSB §3 Security and Privacy Considerations for more.

2.12. Do features in this specification allow an origin some measure of control over a user agent’s native UI?

Features that allow for control over a user agent’s UI (e.g. full screen mode) or changes to the underlying system (e.g. installing an ‘app’ on a smartphone home screen) may surprise users or obscure security / privacy controls. To the extent that your feature does allow for the changing of a user agent’s UI, can it effect security / privacy controls? What analysis confirmed this conclusion?

2.13. What temporary identifiers do the features in this specification create or expose to the web?

If a standard exposes a temporary identifier to the web, the identifier should be short lived and should rotate on some regular duration to mitigate the risk of this identifier being used to track a user over time. When a user clears state in their user agent, these temporary identifiers should be cleared to prevent re-correlation of state using a temporary identifier.

If features in this spec create or expose temporary identifiers to the web, how are they exposed, when, to what entities, and, how frequently are those temporary identifiers rotated?

Example temporary identifiers include TLS Channel ID, Session Tickets, and IPv6 addresses.

The index attribute in the Gamepad API [GAMEPAD] — an integer that starts at zero, increments, and is reset — is a good example of a privacy friendly temporary identifier.

2.14. How does this specification distinguish between behavior in first-party and third-party contexts?

The behavior of a feature should be considered not just in the context of its being used by a first party origin that a user is visiting but also the implications of its being used by an arbitrary third party that the first party includes. When developing your specification, consider the implications of its use by third party resources on a page and, consider if support for use by third party resources should be optional to conform to the specification. If supporting use by third party resources is mandatory for conformance, please explain why and what privacy mitigations are in place. This is particularly important as user agents may take steps to reduce the availability or functionality of certain features to third parties if the third parties are found to be abusing the functionality.

2.15. How do the features in this specification work in the context of a browser’s Private Browsing or Incognito mode?

Most browsers implement a private browsing or incognito mode, though they vary significantly in what functionality they provide and how that protection is described to users [WU-PRIVATE-BROWSING].

One commonality is that they provide a different set of state than the browser’s 'normal' state.

Do features in this spec provide information that would allow for the correlation of a single user’s activity across normal and private browsing / incognito modes? Do features in the spec result in information being written to a user’s host that would persist following a private browsing / incognito mode session ending?

There has been research into both:

2.16. Does this specification have both "Security Considerations" and "Privacy Considerations" sections?

Specifications should have both "Security Considerations" and "Privacy Considerations" sections to help implementers and web developers understand the risks that a feature presents and to ensure that adequate mitigations are in place. While your answers to the questions in this document will inform your writing of those sections, do not merely copy this questionnaire into those sections. Instead, craft language specific to your specification that will be helpful to implementers and web developers.

[RFC6973] is an excellent resource to consult when considering privacy impacts of your specification, particularly Section 7 of RFC6973. [RFC3552] provides general advice as to writing Security Consideration sections, and Section 5 of RFC3552 has specific requirements.

Generally, these sections should contain clear descriptions of the privacy and security risks for the features your spec introduces. It is also appropriate to document risks that are mitigated elsewhere in the specification and to call out details that, if implemented other-than-according-to-spec, are likely to lead to vulnerabilities.

If it seems like none of the features in your specification have security or privacy impacts, say so in-line, e.g.:

There are no known security impacts of the features in this specification.

Be aware, though, that most specifications include features that have at least some impact on the fingerprinting surface of the browser. If you believe your specification in an outlier, justifying that claim is in order.

2.17. Do features in your specification enable origins to downgrade default security protections?

Do features in your spec enable an origin to opt-out of security settings in order to accomplish something? If so, in what situations do these features allow such downgrading, and why?

Can this be avoided in the first place? If not, are mitigations in place to make sure this downgrading doesn’t dramatically increase risk to users? For instance, [PERMISSIONS-POLICY] defines a mechanism that can be used by sites to prevent untrusted iframes from using such a feature.

The document.domain setter can be used to relax the same-origin policy. The most effective mitigation would be to remove it from the platform (see § 4.6 Drop the feature), though that may be challenging for compatibility reasons.
The Fullscreen API enables a (portion of a) web page to expand to fill the display. [FULLSCREEN] This can hide several User Agent user interface elements which help users to understand what web page they are visiting and whether or not the User Agent believes they are safe.

Several mitigations are defined in the specification and are widely deployed in implementations. For instance, the Fullscreen API is a policy-controlled feature, which enables sites to disable the API in iframes. Fullscreen API §7 Security and Privacy Considerations encourages implementations to display an overlay which informs the user that they have entered fullscreen, and to advertise a simple mechanism to exit fullscreen (typically the Esc key).

2.18. What should this questionnaire have asked?

This questionnaire is not exhaustive. After completing a privacy review, it may be that there are privacy aspects of your specification that a strict reading, and response to, this questionnaire, would not have revealed. If this is the case, please convey those privacy concerns, and indicate if you can think of improved or new questions that would have covered this aspect.

Please consider filing an issue to let us know what the questionnaire should have asked.

3. Threat Models

To consider security and privacy it is convenient to think in terms of threat models, a way to illuminate the possible risks.

There are some concrete privacy concerns that should be considered when developing a feature for the web platform [RFC6973]:

In the mitigations section, this document outlines a number of techniques that can be applied to mitigate these risks.

Enumerated below are some broad classes of threats that should be considered when developing a web feature.

3.1. Passive Network Attackers

A passive network attacker has read-access to the bits going over the wire between users and the servers they’re communicating with. She can’t modify the bytes, but she can collect and analyze them.

Due to the decentralized nature of the internet, and the general level of interest in user activity, it’s reasonable to assume that practically every unencrypted bit that’s bouncing around the network of proxies, routers, and servers you’re using right now is being read by someone. It’s equally likely that some of these attackers are doing their best to understand the encrypted bits as well, including storing encrypted communications for later cryptanalysis (though that requires significantly more effort).

3.2. Active Network Attackers

An active network attacker has both read- and write-access to the bits going over the wire between users and the servers they’re communicating with. She can collect and analyze data, but also modify it in-flight, injecting and manipulating Javascript, HTML, and other content at will. This is more common than you might expect, for both benign and malicious purposes:

3.3. Same-Origin Policy Violations

The same-origin policy is the cornerstone of security on the web; one origin should not have direct access to another origin’s data (the policy is more formally defined in Section 3 of [RFC6454]). A corollary to this policy is that an origin should not have direct access to data that isn’t associated with any origin: the contents of a user’s hard drive, for instance. Various kinds of attacks bypass this protection in one way or another. For example:

3.4. Third-Party Tracking

Part of the power of the web is its ability for a page to pull in content from other third parties — from images to javascript — to enhance the content and/or a user’s experience of the site. However, when a page pulls in content from third parities, it inherently leaks some information to third parties — referer information and other information that may be used to track and profile a user. This includes the fact that cookies go back to the domain that initially stored them allowing for cross origin tracking. Moreover, third parties can gain execution power through third party Javascript being included by a webpage. While pages can take steps to mitigate the risks of third party content and browsers may differentiate how they treat first and third party content from a given page, the risk of new functionality being executed by third parties rather than the first party site should be considered in the feature development process.

The simplest example is injecting a link to a site that behaves differently under specific condition, for example based on the fact that user is or is not logged to the site. This may reveal that the user has an account on a site.

3.5. Legitimate Misuse

Even when powerful features are made available to developers, it does not mean that all the uses should always be a good idea, or justified; in fact, data privacy regulations around the world may even put limits on certain uses of data. In the context of first party, a legitimate website is potentially able to interact with powerful features to learn about user behavior or habits. For example:

This point is admittedly different from others - and underlines that even if something may be possible, it does not mean it should always be done, including the need for considering a privacy impact assessment or even an ethical assessment. When designing features with security and privacy in mind, all both use and misuse cases should be in scope.

4. Mitigation Strategies

To mitigate the security and privacy risks you’ve identified in your specification, you may want to apply one or more of the mitigations described below.

4.1. Data Minimization

Minimization is a strategy that involves exposing as little information to other communication partners as is required for a given operation to complete. More specifically, it requires not providing access to more information than was apparent in the user-mediated access or allowing the user some control over which information exactly is provided.

For example, if the user has provided access to a given file, the object representing that should not make it possible to obtain information about that file’s parent directory and its contents as that is clearly not what is expected.

In context of data minimization it is natural to ask what data is passed around between the different parties, how persistent the data items and identifiers are, and whether there are correlation possibilities between different protocol runs.

For example, the W3C Device APIs Working Group has defined a number of requirements in their Privacy Requirements document. [DAP-PRIVACY-REQS]

Data minimization is applicable to specification authors and implementers, as well as to those deploying the final service.

As an example, consider mouse events. When a page is loaded, the application has no way of knowing whether a mouse is attached, what type of mouse it is (e.g., make and model), what kind of capabilities it exposes, how many are attached, and so on. Only when the user decides to use the mouse — presumably because it is required for interaction — does some of this information become available. And even then, only a minimum of information is exposed: you could not know whether it is a trackpad for instance, and the fact that it may have a right button is only exposed if it is used. For instance, the Gamepad API makes use of this data minimization capability. It is impossible for a Web game to know if the user agent has access to gamepads, how many there are, what their capabilities are, etc. It is simply assumed that if the user wishes to interact with the game through the gamepad then she will know when to action it — and actioning it will provide the application with all the information that it needs to operate (but no more than that).

The way in which the functionality is supported for the mouse is simply by only providing information on the mouse’s behaviour when certain events take place. The approach is therefore to expose event handling (e.g., triggering on click, move, button press) as the sole interface to the device.

Two specifications that have minimized the data their features expose are:

4.2. Default Privacy Settings

Users often do not change defaults, as a result, it is important that the default mode of a specification minimizes the amount, identifiability, and persistence of the data and identifiers exposed. This is particularly true if a protocol comes with flexible options so that it can be tailored to specific environments.

4.3. Explicit user mediation

If the security or privacy risk of a feature cannot otherwise be mitigated in a specification, optionally allowing an implementer to prompt a user may be the best mitigation possible, understanding it does not entirely remove the privacy risk. If the specification does not allow for the implementer to prompt, it may result in divergence implementations by different user agents as some user agents choose to implement more privacy-friendly version.

It is possible that the risk of a feature cannot be mitigated because the risk is endemic to the feature itself. For instance, [GEOLOCATION-API] reveals a user’s location intentionally; user agents generally gate access to the feature on a permission prompt which the user may choose to accept. This risk is also present and should be accounted for in features that expose personal data or identifiers.

Designing such prompts is difficult as is determining the duration that the permission should provide.

Often, the best prompt is one that is clearly tied to a user action, like the file picker, where in response to a user action, the file picker is brought up and a user gives access to a specific file to an individual site.

Generally speaking, the duration and timing of the prompt should be inversely proportional to the risk posed by the data exposed. In addition, the prompt should consider issues such as:

These prompts should also include considerations for what, if any, control a user has over their data after it has been shared with other parties. For example, are users able to determine what information was shared with other parties?

4.4. Explicitly restrict the feature to first party origins

As described in the "Third-Party Tracking" section, web pages mix first and third party content into a single application, which introduces the risk that third party content can misuse the same set of web features as first party content.

Authors should explicitly specify a feature’s scope of availability:

Third party access to a feature should be an optional implementation for conformance.

4.5. Secure Contexts

If the primary risk that you’ve identified in your specification is the threat posed by active network attacker, offering a feature to an insecure origin is the same as offering that feature to every origin because the attacker can inject frames and code at will. Requiring an encrypted and authenticated connection in order to use a feature can mitigate this kind of risk.

Secure contexts also protect against passive network attackers. For example, if a page uses the Geolocation API and sends the sensor-provided latitude and longitude back to the server over an insecure connection, then any passive network attacker can learn the user’s location, without any feasible path to detection by the user or others.

However, requiring a secure context is not sufficient to mitigate many privacy risks or even security risks from other threat actors than active network attackers.

4.6. Drop the feature

Possibly the simplest way to mitigate potential negative security or privacy impacts of a feature is to drop the feature, though you should keep in mind that some security or privacy risks may be removed or mitigated by adding features to the platform. Every feature in a specification should be seen as potentially adding security and/or privacy risk until proven otherwise. Discussing dropping the feature as a mitigation for security or privacy impacts is a helpful exercise as it helps illuminate the tradeoffs between the feature, whether it is exposing the minimum amount of data necessary, and other possible mitigations.

Consider also the cumulative effect of feature addition to the overall impression that users have that it is safe to visit a web page. Doing things that complicate users' understanding that it is safe to visit websites, or that complicate what users need to understand about the safety of the web (e.g., adding features that are less safe) reduces the ability of users to act based on that understanding of safety, or to act in ways that correctly reflect the safety that exists.

Every specification should seek to be as small as possible, even if only for the reasons of reducing and minimizing security/privacy attack surface(s). By doing so we can reduce the overall security and privacy attack surface of not only a particular feature, but of a module (related set of features), a specification, and the overall web platform.

Examples

4.7. Making a privacy impact assessment

Some features potentially supply sensitive data, and it is the responsibility of the end-developer, system owner, or manager to realize this and act accordingly in the design of their system. Some use may warrant conducting a privacy impact assessment, especially when data relating to individuals may be processed.

Specifications that include features that expose sensitive data should include recommendations that websites and applications adopting the API conduct a privacy impact assessment of the data that they collect.

A feature that does this is:

Documenting these impacts is important for organizations although it should be noted that there are limitations to putting this onus on organizations. Research has shown that sites often do not comply with security/privacy requirements in specifications. For example, in [DOTY-GEOLOCATION], it was found that none of the studied websites informed users of their privacy practices before the site prompted for location.

Conformance

Document conventions

Conformance requirements are expressed with a combination of descriptive assertions and RFC 2119 terminology. The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in the normative parts of this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. However, for readability, these words do not appear in all uppercase letters in this specification.

All of the text of this specification is normative except sections explicitly marked as non-normative, examples, and notes. [RFC2119]

Examples in this specification are introduced with the words “for example” or are set apart from the normative text with class="example", like this:

This is an example of an informative example.

Informative notes begin with the word “Note” and are set apart from the normative text with class="note", like this:

Note, this is an informative note.

Conformant Algorithms

Requirements phrased in the imperative as part of algorithms (such as "strip any leading space characters" or "return false and abort these steps") are to be interpreted with the meaning of the key word ("must", "should", "may", etc) used in introducing the algorithm.

Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms or specific steps can be implemented in any manner, so long as the end result is equivalent. In particular, the algorithms defined in this specification are intended to be easy to understand and are not intended to be performant. Implementers are encouraged to optimize.

Index

Terms defined by this specification

Terms defined by reference

References

Normative References

[HTML]
Anne van Kesteren; et al. HTML Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/
[IndexedDB-2]
Ali Alabbas; Joshua Bell. Indexed Database API 2.0. 30 January 2018. REC. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/IndexedDB-2/
[RFC2119]
S. Bradner. Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119

Informative References

[ADDING-PERMISSION]
Nick Doty. Adding another permission? A guide. URL: https://github.com/w3cping/adding-permissions
[BATTERY-STATUS]
Anssi Kostiainen; Mounir Lamouri. Battery Status API. 7 July 2016. CR. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/battery-status/
[BEACON]
Ilya Grigorik; et al. Beacon. 13 April 2017. CR. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/beacon/
[COMCAST]
David Kravets. Comcast Wi-Fi serving self-promotional ads via JavaScript injection. URL: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/why-comcasts-javascript-ad-injections-threaten-security-net-neutrality/
[CORS]
Anne van Kesteren. Cross-Origin Resource Sharing. 2 June 2020. REC. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/cors/
[CREDENTIAL-MANAGEMENT-1]
Mike West. Credential Management Level 1. 17 January 2019. WD. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/credential-management-1/
[CSP]
Mike West. Content Security Policy Level 3. 12 May 2021. WD. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/
[DAP-PRIVACY-REQS]
Alissa Cooper; Frederick Hirsch; John Morris. Device API Privacy Requirements. 29 June 2010. NOTE. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/dap-privacy-reqs/
[DISCOVERY-API]
Rich Tibbett. Network Service Discovery. 12 January 2017. NOTE. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/discovery-api/
[DOTY-GEOLOCATION]
Nick Doty, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Erik Wilde. Privacy Issues of the W3C Geolocation API. URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0rp834wf
[ENCRYPTED-MEDIA]
David Dorwin; et al. Encrypted Media Extensions. 18 September 2017. REC. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/encrypted-media/
[FINGERPRINTING-GUIDANCE]
Nick Doty. Mitigating Browser Fingerprinting in Web Specifications. 28 March 2019. NOTE. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/fingerprinting-guidance/
[FULLSCREEN]
Philip Jägenstedt. Fullscreen API Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://fullscreen.spec.whatwg.org/
[GAMEPAD]
Steve Agoston; et al. Gamepad. 8 April 2021. WD. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/gamepad/
[GENERIC-SENSOR]
Rick Waldron. Generic Sensor API. 12 December 2019. CR. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/generic-sensor/
[GEOLOCATION-API]
Andrei Popescu. Geolocation API Specification 2nd Edition. 8 November 2016. REC. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/geolocation-API/
[GYROSPEECHRECOGNITION]
Yan Michalevsky; Dan Boneh; Gabi Nakibly. Gyrophone: Recognizing Speech from Gyroscope Signals. URL: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-michalevsky.pdf
[HOMAKOV]
Egor Homakov. Using Content-Security-Policy for Evil. URL: http://homakov.blogspot.de/2014/01/using-content-security-policy-for-evil.html
[OLEJNIK-ALS]
Lukasz Olejnik. Privacy analysis of Ambient Light Sensors. URL: https://blog.lukaszolejnik.com/privacy-of-ambient-light-sensors/
[OLEJNIK-BATTERY]
Lukasz Olejnik; et al. The leaking battery: A privacy analysis of the HTML5 Battery Status API. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/616
[OLEJNIK-PAYMENTS]
Lukasz Olejnik. Privacy of Web Request API. URL: https://blog.lukaszolejnik.com/privacy-of-web-request-api/
[PERMISSIONS]
Mounir Lamouri; Marcos Caceres; Jeffrey Yasskin. Permissions. 20 July 2020. WD. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/permissions/
[PERMISSIONS-POLICY]
Ian Clelland. Permissions Policy. 16 July 2020. WD. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/permissions-policy-1/
[RFC3552]
E. Rescorla; B. Korver. Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations. July 2003. Best Current Practice. URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3552
[RFC6454]
A. Barth. The Web Origin Concept. December 2011. Proposed Standard. URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6454
[RFC6973]
A. Cooper; et al. Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols. July 2013. Informational. URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6973
[RFC7258]
S. Farrell; H. Tschofenig. Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack. May 2014. Best Current Practice. URL: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7258
[RIVERA]
David Rivera. Detect if a browser is in Private Browsing mode. URL: https://gist.github.com/jherax/a81c8c132d09cc354a0e2cb911841ff1
[SERVICE-WORKERS]
Alex Russell; et al. Service Workers 1. 19 November 2019. CR. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/service-workers-1/
[TIMING]
Paul Stone. Pixel Perfect Timing Attacks with HTML5. URL: http://www.contextis.com/documents/2/Browser_Timing_Attacks.pdf
[VERIZON]
Mark Bergen; Alex Kantrowitz. Verizon looks to target its mobile subscribers with ads. URL: http://adage.com/article/digital/verizon-target-mobile-subscribers-ads/293356/
[WEB-BLUETOOTH]
Jeffrey Yasskin. Web Bluetooth. Draft Community Group Report. URL: https://webbluetoothcg.github.io/web-bluetooth/
[WEBAUTHN]
Dirk Balfanz; et al. Web Authentication:An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1. 4 March 2019. REC. URL: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-1/
[WEBUSB]
WebUSB API. cg-draft. URL: https://wicg.github.io/webusb/
[WU-PRIVATE-BROWSING]
Yuxi Wu; et al. Your Secrets Are Safe: How Browsers' Explanations Impact Misconceptions About Private Browsing Mode. URL: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3186088
[XHR]
Anne van Kesteren. XMLHttpRequest Standard. Living Standard. URL: https://xhr.spec.whatwg.org/
[YUBIKEY-ATTACK]
Andy Greenberg. Chrome Lets Hackers Phish Even 'Unphishable' YubiKey Users. URL: https://www.wired.com/story/chrome-yubikey-phishing-webusb/